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21.
Andr Tchokogu Jean Nollet Julie Fortin 《Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences / Revue Canadienne des Sciences de l\u0027Administration》2015,32(2):113-127
Successful outsourcing of military logistics depends much on cooperation and efficiency, and this article provides an in‐depth analysis of challenges this may pose using collaborative competence theory. Using an exploratory approach, this paper is based on a review of the existing literature and on the experience of the Canadian Armed Forces in a foreign theatre. Specifically, the information collected comes from on‐site observation during the UN mission in Bosnia, semistructured interviews, and archives. Our analysis shows that outsourcing military logistics activities in a foreign theatre should be seen as building and managing a “temporary network.” In order to overcome challenges in such a situation, the Armed Forces must specifically act on the adaptability of all individuals in the theatre. The approach should be based on “collaborative competence.” Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
22.
This paper examines signalling when the sender exerts effort and receives benefits over time. Receivers only observe a noisy public signal about the effort, which has no intrinsic value.The modelling of signalling in a dynamic context gives rise to novel equilibrium outcomes. In some equilibria, a sender with a higher cost of effort exerts strictly more effort than his low-cost counterpart. The low-cost type can compensate later for initial low effort, but this is not worthwhile for a high-cost type. The interpretation of a given signal switches endogenously over time, depending on which type the receivers expect to send it. 相似文献
23.
Bank debt guarantees have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to prevent bank runs. However, as recent experiences in some European countries have demonstrated, guarantees may link the coordination problems of bank and sovereign creditors and induce a functional interdependence between the likelihoods of a government default and bank illiquidity. Employing a global-game approach, we model this link, showing the existence and uniqueness of the joint equilibrium and derive its comparative statics properties. In equilibrium, the guarantee reduces the probability of a bank run, while it increases the probability of a sovereign default. The latter erodes the guarantee’s credibility and thus its effectiveness ex ante. By setting the guarantee optimally, the government balances these two effects in order to minimize expected costs of crises. Our results show that the optimal guarantee has clear-cut welfare gains which are enhanced through policies that promote greater balance sheet transparency. 相似文献
24.
We propose two characteristics of beliefs and study their role in shaping the set of rationalizable strategy profiles in games with incomplete information. The first characteristic, type-sensitivity, is related to how informative a player thinks his type is. The second characteristic, optimism, is related to how “favorable” a player expects the outcome of the game to be. The paper has two main results: the first result provides an upper bound on the size of the set of rationalizable strategy profiles; the second gives a lower bound on the change of location of this set. These bounds are explicit expressions that involve type-sensitivity, optimism, and payoff characteristics. Our results generalize and clarify the well-known uniqueness result of global games (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993). They also imply new uniqueness results and allow us to study rationalizability in new environments. We provide applications to supermodular mechanism design (Mathevet, 2010b) and information processing errors. 相似文献
25.
We propose the notions of mixed and behavioral Ellsberg strategies for extensive form games and prove that these strategies are outcome-equivalent if and only if mixed Ellsberg strategies satisfy a certain rectangularity condition. In addition, we show that not only the profile of Ellsberg strategies must be appropriately chosen but also the extensive form must satisfy further restrictions beyond those implied by perfect recall in order to ensure that each player will respect his ex ante strategy choice with the evolution of play. 相似文献
27.
We make two contributions in this paper. First, we extend the characterization of equilibrium payoff correspondences in history-dependent dynamic policy games to a class with endogenously heterogeneous private agents. In contrast to policy games involving representative agents, this extension has interesting consequences as it implies additional nonlinearity (i.e., bilinearity) between the game states (distributions) and continuation/promised values in the policymaker’s objective and incentive constraints. The second contribution of our paper is in addressing the computational challenges arising from this payoff-relevant nonlinearity. Exploiting the game’s structure, we propose implementable approximate bilinear programming formulations to construct estimates of the equilibrium value correspondence. Our approximation method respects the property of upper hemicontinuity in the target correspondence. We provide small-scale computational examples as proofs of concept. 相似文献
28.
Suppose legislators represent districts of varying population, and their assembly's voting rule is intended to implement the principle of one person, one vote. How should legislators' voting weights appropriately reflect these population differences? An analysis requires an understanding of the relationship between voting weight and some measure of the influence that each legislator has over collective decisions. We provide three new characterizations of weighted voting that embody this relationship. Each is based on the intuition that winning coalitions should be close to one another. The locally minimal and tightly packed characterizations use a weighted Hamming metric. Ellipsoidal separability employs the Euclidean metric: a separating hyper-ellipsoid contains all winning coalitions, and omits losing ones. The ellipsoid's proportions, and the Hamming weights, reflect the ratio of voting weight to influence, measured as Penrose–Banzhaf voting power. In particular, the spherically separable rules are those for which voting powers can serve as voting weights. 相似文献
29.
This paper shows how to solve global games applied to macroeconomics and finance. We ascertain the roles of public and private information for the determination of a unique equilibrium, and discuss the informative role of market prices. We examine the impact of public information on social welfare, comparing models with and without complementarities at the aggregate level. 相似文献
30.
We study how the predictive power of level-k models changes as we perturb the classical beauty contest setting along two dimensions: the strength of the coordination motive and the information symmetry. We use a variation of the Morris and Shin (2002) model as the unified framework for our study, and find that the predictive power of level-k models varies considerably along these two dimensions. Level-k models are successful in predicting subject behavior in settings with symmetric information and a strong coordination motive. Their predictive power weakens significantly when either private information is introduced or the importance of the coordination motive is decreased. 相似文献